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THE RATIONALE OF THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
DIVORCES IN NEW YORK
ARTHUR LENHOFFt

I
Preliminaries
"Above all stick to words."
("Vor allem Izaltet Euch an Worte")

Goethe, Faust I (Mephistopheles' talk to the student).
IN ONE of his recent opinions on a conflict of laws case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter stated: "Conflict-of-law problems have a beguiling tendency to be made even more complicated than they are."' This is
certainly true of the problems which center around divorces obtained
in a foreign state. Musing on them in relation to the so-called estoppel
problem, a New York judge wrote recently that it may not be easy to
detect special consistency in the mass of the court decisions.2 Naturally,
if a lawyer, guided only by the stock word "estoppel," reads the cases
consecutively summarized in a digest, he must be bewildered.
Examining the cases more thoroughly one finds, however, two things.
In the first place, one observes again the psychological triumph of association of ideas over dialectics. Estoppel slipped into a New York
decision on a foreign divorce case more than fifty years agoI and it
was thereafter frequently caught up because of the illusory effects of
its merely allusory use. Like other catch words, the incessant uncritical
repetition of the word "estoppel" has bred faulty concepts and often
inhibited the correct approach to the facts to be adjudicated.
In this way, estoppel is spoken of in connection with foreign divorces
when it is intended to indicate that certain conduct of a party might
preclude him from challenging the divorce decree. To be sure, such preclusion does not square with what the word "estoppel" usually connotes.
Ordinarily, the doctrine of estoppel connotes the denial to a party of the
right to prove a fact to the detriment of his opponent, who had relied on
that fact or on the conduct of the former and changed his legal posi"t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Vanston Bondholders Protective Corn. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 169 (1946).
2. Rosenberg v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
3. Matter of Swales, 60 App. Div. 599, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 220 (4th Dep't IQ0), af'd on
opinion below, 172 N. Y. 651, 65 N. E. 1122 (1902). Van Prunst, P. J., properly rejected
the use of the term "estoppel" in Matter of Morrison, 52 Hun 102 (N. Y. 1859), a!J'd ie,.
sub nora. In re Freyh's Estate, 117 N. Y. 638, 22 N. E. 1130 (18S9). Outside Neew York,
Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa 644. 17 N. W. 28 (1SS3), had used the word "estoppel" as against
the spouse who had accepted benefits granted under the divorce.
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tion accordingly. However, these requirements do not apply to the socalled estoppel to challenge foreign divorces. The doctrine may be invoked regardless of the belief of the one spouse in the validity of the
decree and of any change in the position of the other spouse. Even if
the challenger was firmly convinced that the decree which he procured
was valid and learned only later of its vulnerability, his challenge of
the decree may effectively be met with the objection of a so-called estoppel.4 The courts are aware of the misnomer;rl and sometimes admit it
or speak of "quasi-estoppel." ' For the moment it may suffice to state
that the doctrine results in the preclusion of a party from showing the
vulnerability of the foreign divorce.' To say so is to refer to the effect,
and not to what may produce that effect.
On the whole the results arrived at by the courts are reasonable despite the impossibility of establishing strict rules from the cases. This
article will endeavor to demonstrate a sound rationale for these cases,
although the opinions point to it only infrequently and blur it by the
indiscriminate resort to that weasel word "estoppel." It is thus our task
to make this rationale mor& articulate. This undertaking is all the more
important because a correct classification demonstrates that there is
order where chaos seems to prevail.
The first approach must proceed from the undisputed rule that the
public policy of the forum is limited by the Federal Constitution, 8 in so
far as it seeks to deny recognition to foreign divorces but is not in so far
as it accords recognition. A state must not refuse to give full faith and
credit to the decree of a sister state in which at least one party had
acquired a domicile, even if service of process on the other party was
merely one of the substituted types of service. The constitutional provision refers to a duty, not to a right, of the forum. If the forum recognizes a divorce decree of a sister state even though sound doubts in the
latter's jurisdiction obviate any obligation to do so, no constitutional
command such as due process would be violated. A fortiori, there should
be no objection to such a result where the state of domiciliary origin of
the parties is itself the forum (as will be assumed in this paper).
In the second Williams v. North Carolina case, the Supreme Court
4. Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 988 (1916); Gelsselman v. Gelsselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 AtL 185 (1919).
5. New York Court of Appeals in Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. B. 2d
290 (1940).
6. "Castellani" v. "Castellani," 176 Misc. 763, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 879 (Dona. Rel, Ct.
1941), aff'd sub nom. Capaldo v. Capaldo, 263 App. Div. 984, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (1st
.Dep't 1942).
7. Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 360, 26 N. E. 2d 290, 292 (1940).
8. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1
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distinguished, with respect to the binding force of a foreign decree, between the parties who had had an "appropriate opportunity to present
their contentions" on the one hand, and the "state of domiciliary origin"
on the other. Failure to litigate a question which the parties had the
opportunity to litigate, has at all times been deemed to conclude them."
However, to the state of domiciliary origin, the matrimonial domicile,
is reserved "the right" (it was the Supreme Court which referred to
that "right") to ascertain whether there was domicile in the state of
rendition."
Why has the state this right? The Supreme Court answered by stating that otherwise the "policy of each state in matters of most intimate
concern could be subverted ....
Consequently, where it is the policy
-of the state to recognize a foreign decree if the defendant was personally
served in the foreign state and appeared personally, a decree thus obtained squares with the public policy of the domiciliary state. True,
the divorcees might be deemed domiciliaries of the state of the forum
according to its own legal concept, but is it not for the domiciliary state
itself to set up the safeguards for its interest in the family relation of
its own people? Does not the state define its own public policy? According to the New York Court of Appeals it is the judicial records, in the
absence of statutory declarations, from which one must learn the articulate expression of the state's public policy.
As it will presently be observed, judicial decisions demonstrate unequivocally that the liberal attitude of New York conflicts of law towards the recognition of vulnerable foreign divorces rests upon the consideration given to the contacts between the parties and the state of
rendition. Naturally, the degree to which the parties physically and
jurisdictionally were involved in the foreign domain may vary. The
involvement may shade from the domicile of both spouses in the divorce
jurisdiction into a mere ex parte application for divorce by one spouse
without personal service or appearance or acceptance of the judgment
by the other. The gradations in the intensity of the ties between the
parties and the foreign proceedings will be a good indicator of the extent
9. Williams v. North Carolina (2d case), 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
10. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25 (1917) ; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y.
535 (1371); Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 754 (1st Dep't 1940).
11. In the absence of real litigation on the jurisdictional question, Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 230 (1945).
12. Id. at 231.
13. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930);
Crouch, J., dissenting in Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 475, 3 N. E. 2d 597, 60 (1936) ;
Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 301, 12 N. E. 2d 305, 307 (1938), referring to People v.
Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 12, 51 N. E. 257, 260 (1393).
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of the recognition given by New York courts to the foreign divorce and
will, therefore, substantiate the rationale upon which these courts have
approached the subject of vulnerable foreign divorces.
II
Lemmata si quaeris cur sint adscripta, dodebo: Ut, si malteris,
lemmata sola legas.
Martialis Epigrammata XIV, 2.
Divorces Based Upon Personal Jurisdiction Over Both Parties
Where it is doubtful whether the plaintiff had established a domicile
in the state of rendition, the forum must recognize the foreign decision
only if the question of domicile had been litigated there. If not, the
forum may still fully honor the foreign divorce if both parties were
before the divorce court and the defendant participated in the proceeding. Not all the states have taken this view, which might be called
a personal-jurisdiction approach. Such a view takes into account the
inrem aspect of matrimonial actions which view can be justified solely
for the practical reason that otherwise dissolution of a marriage might
be made impossible if the defendant, being a non-resident, could not
be served personally within the state.
Consequently, where the defendant is personally served with process,
he is granted the opportunity to present his case to the court. In brief,
the conceptual source of the New York policy lies in the assumption
that the proceedings in any one of the sister states entail the same guarantees for fair play and justice as do those in the home state, and that
personal participation in the proceedings strengthens the safeguards
against collusion and fraud the same as a domiciliary proceeding would
do. This policy, of course, is not that of all the several states. This
difference of opinion may explain why the Restatement of Conflicts of
Laws contains a caveat stating that the Institute expresses no opinion on
the question whether by his appearance in the foreign divorce proceeding a party is foreclosed from attacking the judgment upon jurisdictional grounds.14 New Jersey"; and Massachusetts courts, the latter
relying on a policy statutorily defined,1" still refuse recognition to a
14.

I.e., ".

.

. whether and how far a party appearing and participating in the pro-

ceedings in a court of any state is precluded from subsequently questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action in.
the courts of that state or any
other state if the court in which he appeared purported to render a judgment against him."
(Italics added). RESTATEMENT, CoNtLcT oF LAws § 451 (1934).

15.

Giresi v. Giresi, 137 N. J. Eq. 336, 44 A. 2d 345 (1945).

16.

MAss. Amr. LAWS, c. 208, § 39 (1933): "A divorce decreed in another jurisdiction

according to the laws thereof by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both
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divorce obtained in a sister state by a citizen although it is based upon
personal service on the defendant in that sister state and on the personal appearance of both spouses; the 'Massachusetts courts recognize
such decrees only if they concern non-citizens:r
In contrast, California,1 8 Washington, 0 and New York do not deny
the interest and the power of the state of rendition to dissolve the marriage of parties, provided they appeared before the divorce court and
the defendant was personally served there. An unbroken line of decisions rendered by the New York Court of Appeals bears out this proposition. The line begins with Kinnier v. Kinnier,2" decided in 1871, and
ends with Matter of Rhinelander's Estate for the time being.2 1 In between the two cases fall such important decisions as Guggenheim v.
Gould v. Gould
Vahl (1910),12 Tiedeman v. Tiedeman (1919),'
(1923),27 4 Borenstein v. Borenstein (1936),2 Hess v. Hess (1937),21 and
Glaser v. Glaser (1938) .27 The Court of Appeals now has an opportunity to confirm this policy, evinced repeatedly for the last seventyfive years, in the case of Shea v. Shea,2 decided a few months ago in
the Second Department of the Appellate Division2 and now pending in
the Court of Appeals.3
the parties shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of
this commonwealth goes into another jurisdiction to obtain a divorce for a cause occurring here while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a
divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force
or effect in this commonwealth."
17. Cohen v. Cohen, 318 lass. 782, 64 N. E. 2d 689 (1946); Coe v. Coe, 316 Mas:;.
423, 55 N. E. 2d 702 (1944) ; cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903).
18. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal. App. 2d 233, 160 P. 2d 923 (D. Ct. of App., 4th
D. 1945).
19. In re Codling's Estate, 23 Wash. 2d 261, 160 P. 2d 635 (1945).
20. 45 N. Y. 535 (1871).
21. 290 N. Y. 31, 47 N. E. 2d 631 (1943); cf. Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141, 129
N. E. 349 (1920).
22. 13S App. Div. 269, 122 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Ist Dep't 1910).
23. 225 N. Y. 709, 122 N. E. S92 (1919).
24. 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923) (French divorce).
25. 272 N. Y. 407, 3 N. E. 2d 844 (1936).
26. 276 N. Y. 486, 12 N. E. 2d 170 (1937).
27. 276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. 2d 305 (1938).
28. 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946).
29. There exists, of course, a host of New York Supreme Court decisions in cases which
never reached the Court of Appeals; it may suffice to refer to the most recent ones. Holloway v. Holloway, 187 Misc. 333, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 16 ForD. L. JV.
118 (1947), and Verbeck v. Verbeck, 187 Misc. 750, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
reargued, 187 Misc. 750, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 265 (Sup. CL 1946).
30. Motion for appeal granted 270 App. Div. 906, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 618 (2d Dep't 1946).
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Because of this New York policy, a foreign divorce involving New
York citizens obtained with personal service 3 ' on defendant and with
participation of both parties in the proceeding, is given the same full
faith and credit as a foreign decree rendered in compliance with the
two Williams cases. This is one aspect of the New York doctrine. The
Davis v. Davis case32 is illustrative of the binding effect of an adjudica-,
tion by the court of rendition on the issue of domicile. The other aspect
of the New York doctrine concerning foreign divorces of New York
domiciliaries obtained upon personal service and participation of the
parties follows as a corollary. Such a divorce has the same effect in New
York that a foreign divorce is entitled to have in the foreign state if
rendered after a square litigation over the question of plaintiff's domicile in the foreign jurisdiction. One must, however, keep in mind that
this result for the latter category of divorces is derived from the general doctrine of res judicata,33 whereas for the former it rests upon the
particular public policy of New York.
The distinguishing feature between this class of foreign divorces and
others which, like them, are defective in point of domicile, but are subject to the so-called estoppel effect, is the degree of efficacy which
they have. We may summarize the consequences as follows:
First, where the divorce has been obtained abroad upon personal service and participation, it has a binding effect on everybody, not merely
upon the parties and their privies. Therefore, it affects also their second spouses, if any.
Second, such divorce is deemed to have dissolved the previous marThere is more restricted language in the First Department in Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div.
306, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 603 (1947). Recently, the First Department, in Urquhart v. Urquhart,
272 App. Div. 60, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 57 (1947), departed from the policy espoused in the Shea
case by allowing an after-born child to claim its legitimacy as to "father" (divorced three
years prior to child's birth and married to another woman than the child's mother).
31. See the reference to this point in Solotoff v. Solotoff, 269 App. Div. 677, 53
N. Y. S. 2d 510 (2d Dep't 1945), motions for reargument and for leave to appeal denied,

269 App. Div. 777, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 567 (2d Dep't 1945). Is not defendant's appearance
before the foreign court a proper substitute for the requisite of personal service? It Is
certainly one by New York's internal law. (Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 237.) However,
the language used by the courts requiring riersonal service on and appearance by the de-

fendant in the foreign state seems to negative the substitutionary concept. But there is no
case reported to the effect that appearance pending action without personal service would
upset the foundation of New York's policy.
32.

305 U. S. 32 (1938).

33. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 9, § 23, comment d (1942); cf. Schneider v. Schneider,
232 App. Div. 71, 249 N. Y. Supp. 131 (2d Dep't 1931), afl'd, 263 N. Y. 641, 189 N. E.
736 (1934).
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riage for all purposes. Consequently, previous domestic decrees for separate support might be put -to an end, 34 and
Third, there is no longer any legal basis for a prosecution for bigamy
on account of a remarriage after such a divorce.
Fourth, there is no reason to distinguish between effects on the status
on the one hand, and on so-called economic claims such as succession
rights, or claims to death benefits under workmen's compensation law,
on the other.'
Parenthetically it may be added that rights of third persons, especially
children, can never be affected by a divorce decree obtained in a state
which has no personal jurisdiction over them. Thus, it may happen that
the father's divorce abroad relieves him from a domestic support decree
as against his wife; but it will not relieve him of the obligation to support the children. In absence of a new domicile abroad, the father's
domestic domicile remains that of the children?
One warning must be given. The majority of the aforementioned types
of cases are correctly decided, but the language used in the opinions
is at times misleading. The court, for instance, disposed of a case so as
to give the foreign divorce complete recognition; but the language used
might be framed in terms of estoppel 7
Sometimes, the courts refer to "comity" as the basis of their decision. This term is, as Cardozo said, a misleading word, responsible
for much of the trouble. 38 Although in the formative era of conflict of
laws it was probably an important consideration for the sovereign to
have power to accept or to create a certain rule of law, this power ceased
to be discretionary afterwards. The courts are no longer free to refuse
the application of a rule pertaining to the recognition of foreign decrees,
even if the rule is more liberal than that prevailing in other states.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the rule as established in New
34. Cf. Franklin v. Franklin, 295 N. Y. 431, 63 N. E. 2d 429 (1946). As far as the
foreign decree determines alimony it is effective provided there was personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Thus, terms of private agreements incorporated in the foreign decree
are to be given full effect in the home state. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 265 App. Div. 223, 38 N. Y.

S. 2d 312 (Ist Dep't 1942); Schacht v. Schacht, 295 N. Y. 439, 63 N. E. 2d 433 (1946);
Hess v. Hess, 276 N. Y. 4S6, 12 N. E. 2d 170 (1937) ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 12

N. E. 2d 305 (1938); Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 603 (1st Dep't
1947); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
35. City Bank Farmers Trust v. Adams, 267 App. Div. 985, 4S N. Y. S. 2d E01 (1st
Dep't 1944).
36. Schneider v. Schneider, 141 F. 2d 542 (App. D. C. 1944).
37. E.g., McNeir v. McNeir, 178 Va. 285, 16 S. E. 2d 632 (1941); Borenstein v.
Borenstein, 272 N. Y. 407, 3 N. E. 2d 844 (1936).
38. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 193, 201 (1918).
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York presupposes that the court of rendition is given jurisdiction over
the subject matter by the legislature of its state. 9 This requirement
amounts to the requisite of residence, at least for the plaintiff, in the
state of rendition, since there is hardly any foreign statute without a residence requirement.4"
Another requirement has been stressed so often that it may suffice
here merely to mention it. A personal appearance must be made by both
parties to the action. Subsequent appearance of the defendant nunc
pro tunc will not do, as the Lindgren case proved. 4'
Finally, as stated before, a litigation on the question of jurisdiction
and a determination on this point are not requirements for the recognition of a decree which meets with the two other premises; but a real
participation in the proceedings of the parties is indispensable.1 2 Where
there was a mere general appearance without further participation by
the defendant, the judgment may have those effects which will be referred to in the discussion of the second class or vulnerable foreign
divorces, now to be considered. 3
III
Submission to the Jurisdictionby the Defendant Without
Preceding Personal Service or Appearance
For want of a correct expression, the term estoppel is being misused
to cover all classes, but particularly foreign divorces obtained without
personal service and appearance. If one spouse procured a divorce
abroad without the actual presence and participation of the other, two
different situations may develop, with different results. First, the nonparticipating spouse may entirely disregard the divorce decree. Or,
second, the non-participating spouse may by declaration or conduct
39. This is what the New York decisions, referred to in the notes 20-29 s51pra, considered as the foreign court's power over the subject matter. Howe, The Recognition of
Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 CoL. L. R.v. 373, 400 et seq. (1940).
40. New York, e.g., CIv. PRAC. ACT § 1147, requires either residence or the connection of the parties with New York through the celebration of the marriage there.
41. Matter of Lindgren, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944).
42. Verbeck v. Verbeck, 187 Misc. 750, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Rosenberg v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1944) does not contradict
the proposition (first husband, although having entered an appearance, did not participate in the litigation). If by foreign procedural law an answer may test not only the
merits of the action but also the jurisdiction of the court, the delivery of an answer which

contests the jurisdiction, will not be regarded as participation in the litigation. Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
43. Lane v. Lane, 182 Misc. 656, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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show he has acquiesced in, if not acceded to, the decree. Let us take
up the latter category first.
There is no question that appearance after decree, nunc pro tunc,
or application to the foreign court afterwards, for example, for a modification of the alimony provision bars such party from challenging the
decree.' 5 So, undisputedly, does its procurement, or collaboration in its
procurement. Utilizing the decree for a remarriage in no lesser degree
proves submission to the jurisdiction of the court which had rendered it
than the other acts just noted." This consequence of a remarriage was
quite recently once more illustrated in the Carbidon case:10 It is the
affirmative character of such acts which dispels any doubts about the
submission of the non-procuring party to the jurisdiction of the
divorce court.
Naturally, mere negative conduct is creative of conflicting views. Is
continued failure to contest the validity of the foreign divorce tantamount to acquiescence? No answer generally valid can be given because
the decision in the individual case will depend on its facts a Where the
silence of a spouse apprised of the divorce induced the procurer of the
divorce to remarry, there is present not only the element of laches, but
also that of acquiescence."8
One will meet with some difficulties in predicting the significance
which a court may give to the acceptance of pecuniary benefits by the
non-procuring party, where the amount accepted is equivalent to that
provided for in the decree.40 Failure of a spouse during his life to impugn the validity of the foreign divorce procured by the other has been
held to terminate a right to challenge it upon his death."0
44. Vernon v. Vernon, 288 N. Y. 503, 41 N. E. 2d 792 (1942); Matter of Lindgren,
293 N. Y. is, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944); Chapman v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 427, 113 N. E.
359 (1916).
45. Carbulon v. Carbulon, 293 N. Y. 375, 57 N. E. 2d 59 (1944); Matter of Lindgren,
293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 204 App. Div. 116, 197 N. Y.
Supp. 371 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 520, 143 N. E. 726 (1923); Bruguiere v.
Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 938 (1916); Matter of Estate of Bingham, 265 App.
Div. 463, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 756 (2d Dep't 1943); Curry v. Curry, 79 F. 2d 172 (App. D. C.
1935); Horowitz v. Horowitz, 58 R. I. 396, 192 Atl. 796 (1937).
46. Carbulon v. Carbulon, 293 N. Y. 375, 57 N. E. 2d 59 (1944).
47. For rejecting estoppel see Pomerance v. Pomerance, 137 lisc, 20, 61 N. Y. S.
2d 227 (Sup. CL. 1946); Golden v. Golden, 41 N. M. 356, 63 P. 2d 928 (1937).
43. Holmes, J.* considered the divorce unassailable because of the failure of the petitioner to attack it during the life of the other spouse: Brigham v. Dillaway, 176 Mass.
223, 57 N. E. 328 (1900); cf. Bliss v. Bliss, 50 F. 2d 1002 (App. D. C. 1931).
49. Divorce held not subject to an attack in, Guilmain v. Guilmain, 58 N. Y. S. 2d
662 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; cf. In re Haga's Estate, 229 Iowa 380, 294 N. W. 589 (1940).
50. Holmes, J.. in Brigham v. Dillaway, 176 Mass. 223, 57 N. E. 328 (1900); cf. Hub.
bard v. Hubbard, 22S N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 503 (1920).
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Besides the question of acquiescence in, or accession to the foreign
decree, a second problem arises. Such connection with the foreign
divorce decree presupposes apparent jurisdiction of the divorce court.
Where the court lacked even color of jurisdiction when the decree was
procured, not even procurement, nor, a fortiori, participation or subsequent acquiescence can foreclose attack upon that divorce. A decrve
obtained by mail-order or otherwise without any actual residence in a
the foreign state, is void on its face. The significant thing here is the
patent lack of jurisdiction.l
At this point it is now possible to propose the rationale for the group
of decisions which we are discussing. As one can see, the rationale is
cognate to that underlying the full recognition of foreign divorces rendered abroad against domiciliaries of New York upon personal service
and participation in the proceedings. The state expresses its public
policy in holding the parties to the divorce in either class. The difference is, as so often, one of degree. New York gives foreign divorces of
the class previously discussed full faith and credit. However, the recognition of the group now under discussion is restricted, limited, and qualified.
Does the difference rest upon the kind of legal relations to which the
effects of foreign divorces extend? Some dogmatist advanced the formula that the recognition of this class must be deemed to embrace only
so-called economic claims. This position logically would give the divorcees the green light for litigating status actions once more,5 2 and
hence would appear to be erroneous.
The cases usually presented as authority for the opposite opinion are
Vose v. Vose, 3 Querze v. Querze," and Stevens v. Stevens5 Suffice it
to say that in the two first-mentioned decisions the divorces involved
were similar to those in the Shannon case,"0 so-called Mexican divorces.
Obviously, they were devoid of any effect upon status as well as upon
succession rights. In the Stevens case, the wife brought a separation
action, and the husband counter-claimed for divorce upon the ground
of adultery. The court rejected the wife's objection, which was based
on the husband's procurement of an ex parte divorce in Nevada. There
51. For cases and details on this topic, reference may be made to this writer's article, Attacks of Vulnerable Foreign Divorces; Outposts of Resistance, 21 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Ray. 457 (1946).
52. This is, if ever so qualified, often repeated, e.g., in Cohen v. Randall, 137 F. 2d 441
(C. C. A. 2d 1943).

53.
54.
55.
56.

280 N. Y. 779, 21 N. E. 2d 616
290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E. 2d 423
273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. 2d 26
Shannon v. Shannon, 247 App.

(1939).
(1943).
(1937).
Div. 790, 286 N. Y. Supp. 27 (2d Dep't 1936).
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was no remarriage on either part. The court hinted that the result
might have been different by saying: "... we need not inquire what the
result would be in some further event that has not happened.117 There
were no other facts showing any submission of the wife to the Nevada
decree. In addition, the wife herself, by suing for separation had treated
the foreign decree as a nullity. Under the circumstances, the foreign
decree could not have any effects and as the Court of Appeals, commenting on the Stevens case in Krause v. Kranse," significantly pointed
out, the case "would not control a different situation."
Such a different situation was presented to the Court of Appeals in
Vernon v. Vernon. s There, also, the husband had sued for divorce in
New York. The wife referred to a previous Nevada decree, obtained
by her without personal service on the husband and without appearance
on his part; he had, however, subsequently applied to the Nevada court
for a modification of the decree with regard to the alimony clause. The
mere fact of the application proved his submission to the foreign jurisdiction. If it were true that only economic claims are barred, where
the foreign decree concerning domiciliaries was obtained without personal service and appearance, the Court of Appeals could not have dismissed plaintiff's divorce action.
Incidentally, the opinion of the Court of Appeals throws a brilliant
light on the rationale as submitted here. The court, far from resorting
to any estoppel concept, referred to the submission of the non-participating spouse to the foreign jurisdiction. Said the court: "... [The plaintiff]
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of [that foreign state] ... for the
purpose of obtaining relief, [as to alimony and custody] and the result
of such appearance in accordance with the laws of that [foreign] state
was a final decree which was binding upon him and which should be
given full faith and credit in the courts of the State of New York. ' *1
The last important point for a discussion on the group of cases characterized by the connection of both divorcees with the foreign decree,
but without personal service, appearance, and participation in the action,
concerns the effect of such decree upon third persons.
First, who is a third person? Certainly not the representative of one
of the divorcees, as the Court of Appeals expressly stated in Hynes v.
Title Company. 0 The same court took a different view, however, with
respect to a child, a privy in blood, from that view shown against the
executor or administrator, i.e., privies in law. The infant child was
57.
57a.
53.
59.
60.

Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 159, 7 N. E. 2d 26, 27 (1937).
282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940).
288 N. Y. 503, 41 N. E. 2d 792 (1942).
(Italics added). Id. at 904.
273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. 2d 719 (1937).
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deemed not bound by a divorce decree which neither its father, the decedent, nor its mother could ever have disputed. This is the strange result reached by the court in Matter of Lindgren.' In finding for the
child against the claim of the decedent's second wife to letters of administration, the court said: "The divorce action brought by the decedent
and the subsequent appearance therein [nunc pro tune] by the wife did
not suffice to confer upon the foreign divorce court jurisdiction of the
subject matter.""2 The court distinguished between the binding effect
of the foreign decree upon the parents as parties who had submitted to
the foreign jurisdiction, and the lack of a binding effect upon the child
as a third person. In contrast, in Hubbard v. Hubbard,03 the second husband's annulment action based upon the invalidity of the wife's foreign
divorce from the first husband, obtained without personal service and
appearance of the latter, was dismissed. At the time of this annulment
action, the first husband was dead. The court made reference to the fact
that he during his lifetime never disputed the divorce, and a further
dispute must be held out of question, because the death dissolved the
marriage anyway.
It is hardly understandable why the effect of a subsequent submission
to a foreign decree should vary with the way of its expression.14 If failure to challenge the decree during his lifetime by the non-participating
spouse made the divorce unassailable even for the second spouse, one
is puzzled by the Lindgren decision permitting successful challenge by
a person whose status as a third party was at least disputable.
The Hubbard case introduced the second problem, that of attacks
by a second spouse. Disregarding the Hubbard case, one reaches the
conclusion that nothing short of submission to the foreign jurisdiction
can stop him. This conclusion is borne out by the weight of authority.
Davis v. Davis is usually quoted as the leading authority for this statement, although in this case the Court of Appeals contented itself with
affirming the lower court without opinion."5 The annulment action of
the second husband met with complete success notwithstanding the fact
that he, prior to his marriage, knew what kind of divorce decree would
constitute the basis for his marriage. As a matter of fact, it was he who
discovered that there was a possibility of his marrying the defendant
by virtue of an ex parte divorce procured by defendant's spouse in
Florida. The first husband, incidentally, had also remarried and had
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944).
Id. at 24, 55 N. E. 2d at 851.
228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920).
For this question see this writer's article, supra note 51.
279 N. Y. 657, 18 N. E. 2d 301 (1938).
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two children by his second wife. Another authority for regarding a
second husband as a third party entitled to an annulment of his marriage
is Maloney v. Maloney.61
The New York courts will probably discard the identification of a
second spouse with "a third party" only where such spouse actually, if
ever so secretly, controlled the divorce proceeding, even though he didn't
initiate it." Here again, the rationale underlying the adjudications of
this class of divorces supplies the key to the bewildering maze of apparently conflicting decisions. Nothing less than a cohnection of the second
spouse himself with the divorce proceeding and, therefore, with the
foreign jurisdiction, will deprive him of the right to challenge the divorce. By identifying himself with the foreign proceeding, he assumes
in fact the position of a party.
This type of foreign decree has a double aspect. It is effective to
preclude the parties from attacking it, but ineffective as far as third
persons are concerned. Mintz v. Mintz"8 illustrates the consequences of
the two features. There, in an action brought in New York by the second wife who was not connected with the divorce proceeding of the defendant, the second marriage was declared null and void because the
Arkansas divorce pleaded by the defendant was regarded as invalid.
Defendant's first wife, who had also remarried, was not made a party
in this annulment proceeding. Thereafter, in the wake of the annulment judgment, the husband brought a separation action against his
first wife. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court which had
dismissed this separation action. The reasoning of the Appellate Division may be epitomized as follows: What may show the foreign decree
to be void with respect to the second wife, does not necessarily have
this effect in an action between the divorcees themselves, who had submitted to the foreign divorce jurisdiction,3 One can fairly say that the
lot of those divorcees is not a happy one. On the one hand they have no
capacity to re-marry because the new marriage would be held void. On
the other hand, they are, as the decision shows, unable to get a separation or divorce. How can they be helped? It seems that they have to
66.

22 N. Y. S. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 936, 29 X. Y. S. 2d 419

(4th Dep't 1941), aff'd inem., 28S N. Y. 532, 41 N. E. 2d 934 (1942).
67. Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Alisc. 22, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 667 (Sup. CL 1940).
63. 265 App. Div. 333, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 161 (2d Dep't 1942).
69. Neither is any of the parties to the divorce allowed to go behind the divorce
decree, i.e., collaterally to attack the validity of the marriage, the existence of which vas
the basis for the divorce decree. It was the divorce decree, therefore, which conclusively
established the validity of the marriage. Frost v. Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 23 N. Y. S.
2d 754 (1st Dep't 1940); Scafidi v. Scafidi, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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intermarry again, and to wait and to see whether the revamped marriage will have a happy end.
Concluding the discussion, one may ask whether the divorced party,
although precluded from any attack on the divorce as against the other
divorced party, could challenge the validity of his second marriage? The
answer, of course, must be in the negative. Since the public policy considers the foreign court as competent to issue a decree binding upon
the parties at least where both spouses submitted to its jurisdiction,
neither of them can repudiate this binding effect of the foreign decree
as to a third person, particularly a second spouse. As we saw, the second
spouse is not hampered by the divorce decree from asserting its invalidity, but the parties to the divorce are not able to do so against him.
This effect, resulting from the original decree and not from subsequent
conduct of the divorcee, holds true regardless of whether the divorcee
in any subsequent proceedings involving him and a third party, occupies
the position of an attacker or of a defender. Thus, any attempt on the
part of a divorcee to cast off the foreign decree must fail, no matter
whether his cause of action is based upon the invalidity of the decree
or whether he put in its invalidity as a defense.70 Likewise, a charge of
adultery laid by him against the new consort of his spouse, would have
no different result.71
Summarizing, one may state the effects of this class of foreign divorces
in which the defendant failed to appear but later submitted to the decree
as follows:
First: The divorce obtained abroad without compliance with the domicile requirements of the forum has binding effect upon the divorcees and
their privies in law.
Second: This result follows from the restricted recognition given such
divorces by the forum if the foreign jurisdiction rests upon actual residence of the procuring party in the foreign state and unequivocal acts
of submission to the exercise of the foreign jurisdiction by the non-participating party.
Third: Such foreign decree does not preclude third persons from
challenging the validity of the divorce. Consequently, the divorced parties have no capacity to re-marry; to this extent their marriage still
exists.
Fourth: The right to attack, generally given to third parties, is denied
such persons who, either secretly or open and avowedly, procured the
divorce and thus identified themselves with the foreign jurisdiction.
70. Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dep't 1934), aB'd
vien., 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935).
71. Lacey v. Lacey, 38 Misc. 196, 77 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
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Fiftk: Within the limits indicated in the four preceding paragraphs,
the decree is given the effect of barring not only economic claims of the
spouses, but also any action of either party for an adjudication of the
marital status.
IV
Ex parte Decreeswithout Subsequent Acts of Submission
by Defendant
The last group of foreign divorces to be considered are the vulnerable decrees obtained abroad by one party without defendant's appearance, then or later, and without his doing any other act which could
be regarded as a subsequent submission to the proceedings. There is no
reason for the domiciliary state to protect such a divorce from attacks
against its effectiveness. In the view taken by the attacker, the foreign
court lacked the power to change the matrimonial status of the defendant. By adding the weight of the policy formulated by the home state
to his individual interest, surely the momentum of his attack is greatly
reinforced. The domiciliary state has no reason to respect the foreign
divorce proceeding which, aside from the inadequacy of its jurisdictional basis over the subject matter, took place without consent or ratification by the other party.
If this be true, then there is no ground for denying to either party
access to a domiciliary court for the purpose of an adjudication of the
matrimonial status. The conduct of the spouse who had applied to the
foreign court does not suffice to prevent a competent court from vindicating the strong public policy of the domiciliary state in settling status
72
questions of its citizens. Accordingly, it was held in Stevens v. Stevens,
that even the party procuring such an assailable divorce has the right
to bring a new action for divorce in the forum. When, later, the Court
of Appeals in another case73 referred to the fact that Mr. Stevens' new
divorce action was parallel to his former Nevada action in its objective,
the court admitted, nevertheless, the inconsistency between his new procedural theory and that adopted by the Nevada decree. In order to
prevail in New York, Mr. Stevens had to prove the existence of a marriage which, according to the Nevada decree, had been dissolved.
All the more, of course, is the defendant not prevented from claiming
his rights based upon the existence of the marriage, such as that to
separation or divorce. These rights are not limited by a re-marriage of
the party procuring the foreign divorce.'
72.

273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. 2d 26 (1937).

73.
74.

Krause v. Krause, 232 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940).
Matter of Holmes, 291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. 2d 424 (1943).
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A fortiori, third persons, such as the second spouse of the party procuring the decree, will encounter no difficulties in having this second
marriage declared null and void by reason of the invalidity of his spouse's
divorce. The leading cases in New York are Leflerts v. Leflerts 6 and
6 In both cases, the second spouse's right to attack
Fischer v. Fischer."
the validity of the other spouse's divorce was recognized, notwithstanding
the important role which they had played in procuring the divorces. Obviously, one ought not to find any logical difficulties in conceding to
them the right to attack the divorce, if one bears in mind that not even
the procuring party has been denied this right.
For this reason, a differentiation depending upon whether the second
spouse challenges the divorce as a plaintiff or as a defendant, lacks any
legal basis or justification.7" By the same token, it would be erroneous
to make a distinction between an attack upon the validity of the divorce
by a second spouse and an attack by any other interested third party,
such as the relatives of a decedent second spouse. 78
The described effects follow from the forum's refusal to recognize
the right of the divorce court to the exercise of jurisdiction. To put it
more strongly, one may say that the forum considers the exercise of
such jurisdiction by the foreign court as an usurpation rather than as
a merely erroneous assumption of the existence of plaintiff's domicile in
the state. For the same reason, the avenues to collateral attacks on the
decree at any time by anybody have been opened.
75. 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933).
76. 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930).
77. This can be seen on the one hand from Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657, 18 N. E.
2d 301 (1938) ; Brunel v. Brunel, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (second spouse was plaintiff);
and on the other hand from Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933);
Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930) ; Honig v. Honig, 267 App. Div.
908, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 623 (2d Dep't 1944), dismissed for failure to prosecute appeal, 293
N. Y. 856, 59 N. E. 2d 444 (1944); Maloney v. Maloney, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct.
1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 936, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 419 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N. Y.
532, 41 N. E. 2d 534 (1942); Brown v. Brown, 164 Misc. 792, 299 N. Y. Supp. 487
(Sup. Ct. 1937) (second spouse was defendant). Contra is only Heller v. Heller, 259 App.
Div. 852, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940), aB'd, 285 N. Y. 572, 33 N. E. 2d 247 (1941).
(Continuation of the marriage by the second husband after his discovery of the vulnerability of his wife's divorce held barring his annulment action.) And there are a few
decisions of the lower courts to the effect that a second spouse who procured the divorce
of his spouse from his first consort is deemed to be precluded from challenging the
validity of the divorce. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566
(1st Dep't 1917); P'andelides v. Pandelides, 182 Misc. 819, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (Sup. Ct.
1944); Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
78. E.g., Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div. 235, 197 N. Y. Supp. 674 (4th Dep't 1922), afl'd
men., 237 N. Y. 519, 143 N. E. 726 (1923).
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Although this analysis is valid as to questions of status, it is not suggested that the same approach is required for questions concerning economic claims. Why? Because the lack of personal jurisdiction is decisive for matters of maintenance and support. In most states, support
orders granted in marital cases survive the pronouncement of divorce
decrees and the enforcement of separation agreements. If, exceptionally, such orders and agreements terminate on divorce (for example,
where they are expressly limited to "the duration of the marriage")
such a termination presupposes an attack-proof foreign divorce decree.
The Supreme Court of the United States last held to this effect in the
Esenwein case.79 It is, therefore, clear that foreign divorce decrees of
the type here defined, vulnerable as they are, cannot put domestic support orders or separation agreements out of effect.Fs Where such orders
or agreements, as in New York, do not end on divorce, a foreign divorce
decree, even though it is fully enforceable under both Williams v. North
Carolina cases, cannot supersede the former alimony order or separation agreement, unless it is issued on personal jurisdiction over both
spouses.s Whether or not the foreign decree made2 any provision for
the support of wife and children will be immaterial
Statutory provisions make clear that the procurement of a foreign
divorce which is not recognized has the same destructive effect upon
succession rights created by operation of law as a recognized divorce
necessarily would produce."
Much as the topics previously discussed seem to point to the absolute
legal ineffectiveness of a foreign decree obtained ex parte and without
subsequent submission by the defendant, such a conclusion must not be
accepted without some qualification. A consideration of two other
aspects of divorces of this kind is necessary to prevent too broad a statement of the doctrine.
In the first place, we are faced with the general principle, so assiduously repeated by the Supreme Court, that the jurisdiction of the foreign
court over the subject matter is to be presumed unless disproved by
extrinsic evidence or by the record itself.84 In particular, the recent de79. Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U. S. 279 (1945).
So. Durlacher v. Durlacher, 123 F. 2d 70 (C. C. A. 9th 1941); Russo v. Ruzo, 62
N. Y. S. 2d 514 (City Ct. 1946), 47 CoL. L. Rnr. 1SS (1947).
S1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1S78).
82. Douglas, J., concurring in Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U. S. 279 (1945), referring
to Fennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1S78). To the same affect, Estin v. Estin, 63 N. Y. S.
2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd ,n ., 271 App. Div. 829, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (2d Dep't 1947).
83. N.Y. DEcrDz.', EsTaTE L.%w §§ IS (3), 87 (b).
S4. Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940); Adam v. Saenger. 303 U. S, 59 (1933);
German Saving and Loan Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125 (1004).
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cision of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Holmes,80 presents an important development in this direction. There, in 1939 the first wife obtained in the domicile, New York, a divorce after her husband had two
years previously procured a Nevada divorce ex parte and had re-married.
In 1942, the second wife died intestate. Her sister, disputing the husband's claim to letters of administration, challenged the validity of his
second marriage with reference to the New York divorce decree rendered after the marriage with her sister. The Court of Appeals held that
the decedent's sister must accord the earlier Nevada divorce full recognition until impeached by preponderant evidence that the decedent's
husband had no domicile in Nevada at the time when he obtained a
divorce there. In other words, the court decided that the Nevada decree,
although incapable of dissolving the marriage of the first wife, maintAined its presumptive effect on any other interested person who, like
the sister, was not a party to the New York divorce proceeding.8" The
suggestion that the husband should be held estopped from claiming his
share in his second wife's estate was expressly rejected by the highest
court in New York.
The rationale of this holding is here again that of the extent of recognition given to the foreign decree. The difference between the first two
classes and the third class of foreign divorces does not lie in the rationale; it lies rather in the kind of limitation placed upon the recognition of the foreign decree. In the previously discussed cases the limitation ran to the incidence of the divorce; here, it is the length of time
for which the foreign divorce is to be recognized. In this latter situation the foreign divorce loses its effect only upon the successful challenge.
With this distinction, we turn to the second and last problem. Does
the procurer of the foreign decree also have the right to put its effect
to an end by challenging the validity of the decree for which he himself
had applied in the foreign court? If the Stevens case is still the law, the
answer will be in the affirmative. Yet, the procurer of the foreign decree
in this case challenged its validity before he re-married. Thus the case
presented the conflict between only two policies. On the one hand, the
courts have, in general, been reluctant to grant that party standing to
repudiate a foreign judgment, where he himself had invoked the foreign
jurisdiction.8 7 On the other hand, the state has a preeminent interest
85. Matter of Holmes, 291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. 2d 424 (1943), affirming 265 App. Dlv.
1033, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (4th Dep't 1943), the Appellate Division had reversed the Surrogate's order denying the husband's claim.
86. Id. at 273, 52 N. E. 2d at 430.
87. Blackburn, J., in Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155. 161 (1870).
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in the control over the matrimonial relations of its citizens. Shall the
former interest be subordinated to the latter even when another preponderant interest claims attention? This third interest is that which arises
when the claimant enters upon a second marriage after having obtained
a foreign divorce which was presumptively effective at home. In the
Kraase case,SS the Court of Appeals said that this third interest, strengthened by the weight of the anti-repudiation rule, must still be balanced
against the interest of the domiciliary state in the control of the original
marital status even when this status is relied upon by its erstwhile repudiator.
Note that at the time when the court held that 'Ur. Krause could
not get away scotfree from the pecuniary obligations inherent in his
new marriage, the Haddock ° doctrine exerted its sway all over this
country. The foreign decree at that time showed on its face its unenforceability in New York. At present, the unenforceability of a foreign decree, even if obtained without personal service on the defendant and
without any participation or submission to the jurisdiction on his part,
depends upon evidence disproving the existence of plaintiff's domicile
in the foreign state. If the former spouse or the present spouse of the
party who procured the decree does not take up the cudgel against the
validity of the divorce, it will be very hard for the procurer of the divorce to overcome the admissions presented in his declarations which
were given under oath in the foreign proceeding.
Where the burden to disprove his foreign domicile at the time of the
divorce is placed upon him, he will hardly dare to demand a judgment
as to his marital status. Why? Whether he demands it in a direct action
or in an counterclaim only, his adversary may compel him to face a
jury trial. It does not take great imagination to predict the verdict.
Consequently, even if the hero of such cases confined his impugnment of the divorce to a defense to the support and separation action
of his second wife, it is not difficult for the court to charge him with the
support obligation, without any adjudication of his marital status respecting his first wife.
Thus, a balancing of conflicting public policies, and the force of a
foreign divorce not yet shaken in its foundation, and considerations
adumbrated before, combine to strengthen the rule suggested by the
Krause case and carried further in Matter of Holmes. Little space is
therefore left for "estoppel." It is no longer a wrong to establish a separate domicile in a foreign state, even if the other spouse was not guilty
,3. Krmuse v. Krause, 2S2 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940).
z9. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
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of any misconduct. To preclude the procurer of a foreign divorce from
the right to attack his new marriage is not to penalize him who might
have acted in good faith, or to reward his second wife who might have
been instrumental in procuring the divorce. In this class of divorces
the result is also dependent upon the efficacy of the vulnerable foreign
divorce, and the degree of its efficacy is determined by the public policy,
which varies with the facts upon which the foreign court claimed jurisdiction.
From the foregoing analysis, one may reach the following conclusions:
First: A divorce decree obtained upon alleged domicile by one spouse,
but without any present or subsequent submission to the divorce jurisdiction by the other, is subject to attacks by the latter or by any third
person, new spouses or non-spouses alike.
Second: The right of the procurer to impugn his foreign divorce is
qualified by his entering into a second marriage at a time when the
divorce decree was not yet declared invalid. The economic rights of
the second spouse are regarded as immune from his attacks upon the
foreign decree which purported to dissolve his first marriage.
Third: The burden of disproving the jurisdictional fact upon which
the foreign decree was rendered lies upon the challenger. Therefore, a
subsequent judgment rendered in the domiciliary state in a status action
brought by the non-participating spouse acquires no significance beyond
the litigants as far as the jurisdictional facts are concerned. Until a
third person meets that burden, the foreign divorce may still display
its efficacy.
Fourth: Statutorily, by the mere fact of procuring the foreign divorce,
a spouse loses any title to economic claims based upon the marital relationship, whereas such claims against him or his estate are saved to
the other spouse.
Conclusion
Where one problem placed frequently before the courts has produced
a vast and ever increasing body of reported material, it may suggest its
intricate nature or it may prove the inadequacy of exploration and
guidance to cope with the realities of the problem. The first suggestion recalls Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis which served as the keynote for this paper.
The second suggestion offers a plan whereby one may look for a direction. It was the purpose of this paper to submit a rationale for a body
of law that seemingly shows such irrational features as to baffle any
attempt to predict the results in individual cases.
Of course, the answer to the question whether judicial opinions evince
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a doctrinal rationale (which means the stated fundamentunt classificationis) depends upon the test of its practicability. If the classification,
in fact if not in words, conditions the results arrived at in the individual
cases, it proves its rational character. Is it not the function of a rationale
to dissipate the great fear haunting the lawyers, the fear that a plethora
of authorities makes it impossible to venture a prediction of what the
courts might do in the case submitted to the lawyer's advice?
There is no need for a summary because for every one of the three
classes of divorces the results arrived at have been stated. What is not
discussed in this paper is the treatment of such divorces in a third
state, a state which is neither the state of rendition nor the state of
domiciliary origin. " ' However, this is a subject which requires special
observation and discussion. The same is true of the question of fraud
and collusion and its influence on the jurisdictional problems discussed
here; it is of general significance in the conflict of laws and is not restricted to the part devoted to foreign divorces.
90. This problem has been discussed in this writer's article, supra note 51.
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